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ABSTRACT 
Corruption has detrimental impact on the effectiveness of ODA on HIV outcomes. 
Therefore, realizing that control of corruption is a prerequisite condition for effective ODA, 
donor countries provide financial assistance to promote corruption status of the recipient 
countries. However, no studies have been conducted to investigate the impact of these 
assistance for anti-corruption strategies on HIV outcomes. Basically, this paper tries to fill this 
gap. 
 This paper uses panel-fixed effect model using data of seventeen countries from Asia, 
Latin America, Africa, and Europe with ten-year period between 2005 and 2014. The main 
finding of the paper is that if a country receives ODA for anti-corruption, its HIV prevalence 
will become 8.6% less but its AIDS-death is not affected. In fact, this is a two-stage process. 
First, ODA for anti-corruption will affect corruption status and then corruption status will affect 
HIV outcomes. Therefore, one more regression is run to investigate this link and whether ODA 
for anti-corruption has effective impact on corruption status. However, this result shows that 
ODA for anti-corruption decreases the corruption status rather than promotes it, though the 
result is insignificant. 
 Therefore, ODA for anti-corruption may have significant impact on HIV prevention 
programs to some extent but no significant impact is found on AIDS treatment programs and 
corruption status in general. 
 In sum, AIDS treatment programs which are much prone to corruption due to expensive 
treatment drugs should also be emphasized to reduce AIDS-death by promoting the 
effectiveness of ODA flows to treatment programs. At the same time, the effectiveness of ODA 
for anti-corruption should be evaluated more with rigorous model specification and abundant 
data. 
 CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Historical Background 
 HIV/AIDS has emerged as a global threat since its epidemic in 1981. At the end 
of 2015, there were 36.7 million people living with HIV while 1.1 million people died from 
AIDS-related illness. Approximately 95 % of these people reside in developing world(GBD 
2015 HIV Collaborators, 2016). Due to the lack of financial resources, developing countries 
cannot address the issue of HIV/AIDS on their own. Therefore, they rely on foreign aid 
provided by the international community to contain the disease. 
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Figure 1: Estimated number of people living with HIV and AIDS-death around the 
globe in 2015 
 
1.2 Problem Statement 
 Investment in HIV/AIDS program has increased dramatically - year by year, reaching 
8.6 billion US dollars in 2015 that was about 9 times the amount of investment in 2002 (1.2 
billion US dollars) (UNAIDS, 2015). Despite the tremendous increase in quantity of aid, 
however, HIV/AIDS outcomes show little significant improvement. For example, AIDS-
related deaths were reduced from 1.5 million in 2002 to 1.1 million in 2015. This situation 
raises a question: why did foreign aid for HIV/AIDS did not achieve as much improvement as 
it should have? Therefore, more attention needs to be paid to quality of aid assistance rather 
than quantity. 
3 
 
 
Figure 2: Trend of global funding for HIV/AIDS (2002-2015) 
SOURCES: UNAIDS and Kaiser Family Foundation analyses; Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and 
Malaria online data queries; UNITAID Annual Reports and direct communication; OECD CRS online data 
queries.  
 
 
Figure 3: Global HIV trend (1990-2014) 
1.3 HIV and ODA 
 In fact, the impact of ODA on HIV/AIDS outcomes has been increasingly 
studied for years. The results of these studies show the positive impact of ODA on HIV/AIDS 
outcomes. For instance,  Peiffer and Boussalis  (2010) state that foreign aid assistance is one 
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of the significant means to improve HIV/AIDS outcomes by promoting the anti-retroviral 
therapy (ART) coverage. Another empirical analysis compares the impact of different amounts 
of ODA on AIDS-related death between the countries which receive high flow of ODA and 
those which receive low flow of ODA (Nunnenkamp, 2011). The result shows that low rate of 
AIDS-related death is related to the high flow of ODA. 
 
1.4 HIV and Corruption 
 Although previous studies consistently argue that ODA has a significant impact on 
HIV/AIDS outcomes, recipient countries respond differently to these foreign aid programs 
depending on their country-specific conditions such as governance, level of corruption and 
democratic accountability (Lee, Yang, & Kang, 2016). Consequently, there has been increasing 
research to explore these prerequisite conditions that determine the effectiveness of HIV- 
specific ODA. Most studies state that good governance is a necessary condition for effective 
ODA. For example, low HIV prevalence rate is related to good governance level, including 
control of corruption (Bassole, 2010; Lee, Yang, & Kang, 2015). Moreover, it is suggested that 
control of corruption has a positive impact on effectiveness of ODA for HIV (Lee et al., 2016). 
 Generally, corruption can be defined as the misuse or the abuse of the public office for 
private gain and may be in the forms of bribery, extortion, fraud, nepotism, speed money and 
falsification of records (World Bank,1997). Robert Klitgaard postulated that monopoly of 
power when combined with discretion and absence of accountability leads to corruption. He 
stated this in the following formula; 
 C = M + D – A 
where C = Corruption, M = Monopoly of Power, D = Discretion, A = Accountability. In 1999, 
United Nations Development Program(UNDP) modified this formula by adding two more 
factors, Integrity and Transparency. 
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 C = (M+D) – (A+I+T) 
where I = Integrity and T = Transparency. 
 In HIV/AIDS programs, there are already conditions such as the extent of the problem 
which is global and needs huge amount of funds, the pandemic nature of disease, social stigma 
attached to the disease and highly valuable treatment drugs that make a favorable environment 
for corruption to take place. Additionally, poor management, mismanagement, poor audit 
system with lack of transparency, accountability and integrity make HIV/AIDS funds more 
prone to corruption. 
1.4.1 Corruption indicators in HIV/AIDS sector 
 The corruption mechanisms in HIV/AIDS sector is not much different from those in 
health sector in general such as misappropriation of funds for public education, treatment and 
of medicine. But as mentioned above, the pandemic nature of HIV/AIDS, social stigma 
attached to disease and expensive treatment make HIV/AIDS programs more prone to 
corruption. Corruption can be seen in both prevention and treatment programs of HIV/AIDS. 
 In prevention programs, corruption can be in the form of falsification of records where 
fraudulent activities were reported, informal payments for the services and supplies which are 
meant to be delivered free such as sterile needles, fund food or school fees and manipulating 
the necessary prevention programs and equipment. 
 In treatment programs, corruption can be seen in the form of selling expensive ART 
drugs to the informal markets by health personals and patients themselves and informal tips 
and favors demanded by health workers for proper services. An instance for the second case 
was detected in the case of Malawi Network of People Living with HIV/AIDS where some 
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cases of abuse by health care providers demanding sexual, monetary or material favor and tips 
from the patients or patients’ family members were reported. (Seedat,2011) 
Therefore, corruption is one of the serious challenges donor countries have to face in 
HIV/AIDS aid programs because corruption undermines the effectiveness of the aid program 
to fight against HIV/AIDS and both uninfected vulnerable and infected people may suffer more 
than they would otherwise. Moreover, Taylor and Dickinson states in Global Corruption Report 
2006 as  
“For every dollar taken by a corrupt official, a life of an HIV positive patient is compromised. 
It is not the amount of funds that is important but the effect it has on those less privileged and 
are dependent on the State or donor agencies to receive the necessary resources for their well-
being.” 
 
1.4.2 Reported cases of corruption in HIV/AIDS funds 
 There are some reported cases of misuse in HIV/AIDS funds. These cases are reported 
by the Office of the Inspector General(OIG) of Global Fund. In this OIG report, it was stated 
that Global Fund had used 13 billion US dollar for health programs and 34 million US dollar 
were misused.  In Zambia in 2010, 8 million US dollar which was donated to the Ministry of 
Health by the Global fund for HIV/AIDS program was missing, and it was reported that 12 
million US dollar was in unaccountable expenditures and 1 million US dollar in non-delivered 
goods. Similarly, in Kenya, 5.2 million US dollar was involved in corruption and misuse and 
also 72% of grant activities of Kenya HIV/AIDS disaster response project were used 
improperly (Seedat,2011). Moreover, it was uncovered that 2.23 million US dollar was misused 
in Namibia in 2012. (Namibian, 2012) 
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1.5 How OECD support anti-corruption strategies 
 Based on the past experiences, donor countries recognize the fact that just providing 
funds is not sufficient enough to fight against HIV/AIDS in developing countries and needs to 
provide financial assistance to recipient countries to fight against corruption by developing 
proper management and audit system. Therefore, donor countries provide foreign aid not only 
for HIV/AIDS programs but also for programs to promote anti-corruption strategies in recipient 
countries, which in turn can enhance the effectiveness of ODA, thereby improving HIV/AIDS 
outcomes.  
 OECD supports the governments of Asia, Latin-America, Africa and Europe to 
support the fight against corruption in these regions. Generally, OECD jointly develops the 
Anti-Corruption Action Plan with the member governments and work together to implement 
this action plan supporting through three mechanisms; policy dialogue and measuring progress, 
policy analysis and capacity building. Steering group meetings and regional conferences where 
policy dialogue take place are held regularly to assess the progress, exchange ideas and 
experiences in the design and implementation of reform process, and determine challenges and 
possible solutions for future plan.  Thematic reviews are conducted for more in-depth analysis 
of specific issues in each member country. For capacity building, training seminars and 
workshops on financial management are conducted bringing experts from the member 
countries, OECD countries and OECD Working Group on Bribery. Hence, member 
governments would be able to mitigate the negative effects of corruption on political, social 
and economic development (ADB/OECD anti-corruption initiative). 
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1.6 Purpose of the paper 
 Thus, recipient countries of HIV/AIDS funds also receive financial assistance from 
donor countries which is aimed to develop their financial management and support the fight 
against corruption. Since corruption has negative impact on the effectiveness of ODA for 
HIV/AIDS, it can be intuitively said that ODA for HIV/AIDS would be more effective if the 
corruption status of the recipient country is improved. The main purpose of this paper is to 
explore the impact of foreign aid for anti-corruption strategies on HIV prevalence and AIDS-
related death in the countries which receive foreign aid for anti-corruption strategies. This 
paper studies seventeen countries with eleven-year period (2004-2014) from Asia, Latin-
America, Africa and Europe. 
 The paper is structured in five chapters. The first chapter describes the 
background, problem statement, corruption and HIV/AIDS funds, how OECD supports anti-
corruption programs and motivation of the study. Then review of literature will be discussed 
in chapter two. Descriptive study and data analysis using Stata will appear in chapter three. 
Then, chapter four presents the results of the study and finally some implications and 
conclusive remarks are stated in chapter five. 
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 According to UNAIDS, 8.9 billion US dollars was invested in 2015 to fight against 
HIV/AIDS globally and it is about 9-fold increase when compared to 1.2 billion in 2002. 
However, health outcomes of HIV/AIDS show no significant improvement in developing 
countries in spite of this tremendous increase in aid assistance from the international 
community. Therefore, there has been increasing concern about the quality of aid assistance 
rather than quantity and consequently several studies were conducted to explore the underlying 
cause of ineffectiveness of ODA for HIV. 
 There have been some studies that investigate the links between HIV-specific ODA and 
HIV/AIDS-related outcomes such as death, the rate of new infection (incidence) and 
prevalence of HIV. Peiffer and Boussalis  (2010) conducted an empirical research to assess the 
impact of ODA on HIV/AIDS outcomes using the universal coverage of anti-retroviral therapy 
(ART) as a dependent variable. Their findings suggest that increasing foreign aid is one of the 
significant means to achieve universal ART coverage, successful education and prevention 
policies. On the other hand, the number of AIDS-related death and that of people living with 
HIV are used as dependent variables in a study conducted by Peter Nunnenkame and Hannes 
Ohler (2010). The Difference-Difference-Difference estimation method was used in this study 
to explore the difference in HIV/AIDS outcomes between treatment and control groups. The 
treatment group consisted of the countries which received high flow of ODA while the 
countries with low flow of ODA were included in the control group. The result shows that 
ODA has a significantly negative impact on AIDS-related deaths, but no significant effect on 
the number of people living with HIV. 
 Similarly, Bendavid and Bhattacharya (2009) used a Difference-in-Difference model 
to investigate the effects of PEPFAR (President’s Emergency Plan for HIV/AIDS relief in 
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Africa, US) in sub-Sahara Africa. The results showed significant differences between the 
treatment group which received PEPFAR program aid and the control group which did not. 
However, the results may be biased because other donor groups also scaled up the HIV/AIDS 
funding to the same countries at the same time with PEPFAR. 
 Above studies show that ODA has significant impact on HIV/AIDS outcomes. 
However, there are variations in response to foreign aid by the recipient countries. Many 
studies have been conducted to figure out the reason for these different responses of the 
recipient countries. For instance, control of corruption is stated as one of the important 
determinants of effective health care delivery (Lewis, 2006). Higher level of corruption can 
spread among public officials working in different sectors in some countries, especially in 
Africa, a recipient of high flow of foreign aid (Dambisa Moyo, 2009).  Health sector is no 
exception. Hence, corruption has a negative impact on health outcomes by reducing the actual 
amount of foreign aid for implementation of the aid program. This is more true for HIV/AIDS 
because the pandemic nature of the disease, social stigma attached to HIV and expensive 
treatment creates more vulnerable conditions for corruption. Consequently, the willingness of 
donor states to provide funding may be reduced. Therefore, if the foreign aid program focuses 
only on a narrow, specific field, this aid program will have no or little impact on desired 
outcomes (Lewis & Moran, 2006).  
 There have been several studies which investigate the relationship between control of 
corruption and HIV prevalence. For example, Bassole (2010) investigated the relationship 
between governance level, including control of corruption and HIV prevalence. This paper 
highlights that low HIV prevalence level is related to good governance. This result is consistent 
with the result of the empirical analysis conducted by Lee at el. (2016). The latter report states 
that control of corruption has a positive impact on the effectiveness of ODA for HIV.  
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 Furthermore, another study conducted by Friedman (2015) investigated the impact of 
corruption on the effectiveness of ART in preventing AIDS deaths. He used a panel data set of 
sub-Saharan African countries with eight-year period from 2000 to 2007.  Using panel data 
fixed effect model, the paper states that HIV deaths are more reduced in less corrupt countries 
supplied the same quantity of antiretroviral drugs. 
 Only one qualitative research has been conducted so far analyzing the combination of 
governance factors, including control of corruption, a prerequisite condition for the low 
prevalence of HIV/AIDS (Lee. HY, Yang. BM and Kang. M, 2015). This empirical research 
uses Fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (Fs/QCA) that can identify a combination of 
factors that determine the outcome. The result of this research suggests that good governance 
is a prerequisite condition for low HIV/AIDS prevalence in a recipient country. 
 In sum, several studies mentioned above consistently state that corruption undermines 
the efficiency and effectiveness of ODA to fight against HIV/AIDS. Control of corruption in 
recipient countries is a prerequisite condition to achieve an efficient allocation of ODA. 
Otherwise, tremendous increase in financial support for HIV/AIDS will not be translated into 
positive results. In a study published by ISS (South African Institute for Security and Studies, 
2007), corruption is referred to as a “lethal cocktail” (Schulz-herzenberg, n.d.). Therefore, 
donor countries provide financial support not only for HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment 
programs, but also for creative aid programs to promote anti-corruption strategies of the 
recipient countries. Intuitively, ODA for anti-corruption strategies will improve the corruption 
status of the recipient countries and this will in turn enhance the effectiveness of ODA for HIV. 
However, no studies have been conducted yet to explore the impact of these creative aid 
programs for anti-corruption strategies on HIV/AIDS outcomes. 
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CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Model specification 
To study the impact of ODA for anti-corruption strategies on HIV prevalence and AIDS-related 
death of seventeen developing countries with ten-year period between 2005 and 2014, the paper uses 
panel fixed effect model using Stata econometric software. The countries studied in the paper are 
Afghanistan, Algeria, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Georgia, Indonesia, Malawi, 
Morocco, Nepal, Peru, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Senegal, Tanzania, Thailand and Ukraine. The model used 
in the paper is as follow: 
Y it = β0 + β1 HIV-ODA it + β2 [dummy for Anti-corruption ODA]it + β3 Control Variables it 
lnhivpreit = β0 + β1lnhivodait + β2dummyanticorrit + β3lngdpit + β4lnhexpit + β5lneduit + 
β6lnfemaleunempit + β7lnchildnewit + β8ART +  Uit  (Model -1) 
lndeathit = β0 + β1lnhivodait + β2dummyanticorrit + β3lngdpit + β4lnhexpit + β5lneduit + β6ARTit + Uit 
(Model-2) 
In the models, “I” refers to each country and “t” refers to each year. The definition of each notation 
are as follows: 
lnhivpre = HIV prevalence total in logarithmic form 
lndeath = AIDS-related death in logarithmic form 
lnhivoda = ODA for HIV/AIDS in logarithmic form 
dummyanticorr = dummy variable for receiving ODA for anti-corruption strategies taking 1 if 
received and 0 otherwise 
lngdp = GDP per capita in logarithmic form 
lnhexp = public health expenditure per capita in logarithmic form 
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lnedu = primary enrollment rate (both sexes) in logarithmic form 
lnfemaleunemp = female unemployment rate in logarithmic form 
lnchildnew = children newly infected with HIV in logarithmic form 
lnART = ART coverage in logarithmic form 
 Model-1 is used to study the impact of ODA for anti-corruption on HIV prevalence while 
model-2 is study the impact on AIDS-related death. 
 
3.2 Variable description 
1. HIV prevalence 
 HIV prevalence is the total percentage of population aged between 15 and 49 years. The data 
are obtained from the World Development Indicator. 
2. AIDS-related death 
 AIDS-related death is the annual estimated number of death due to AIDS-related causes. The 
data are obtained from the World Development Indicator. 
3. ODA for HIV 
 ODA for HIV is total disbursements of Official Development Assistance for HIV programs 
delivered through all channels and described in current US$ in million. The data are derived from OECD 
data set. 
4. ODA for anti-corruption 
 ODA for anti-corruption strategies is the total disbursement of Official Development 
Assistance for promoting corruption status of the recipient countries and described in current US$ in 
million. The data are obtained from OECD data set. 
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5. Public health expenditure 
 According to the World Bank, public health expenditure consists of recurrent and capital 
spending from government budgets, external borrowings and grants and social or mandatory health 
insurance funds. Increasing public health expenditure is associated with reducing HIV mortality rate 
(Mahiben et al,2015). 
6. GDP per capita (in current US$) 
 GDP per capita is defined by the World Bank as gross domestic product divided by midyear 
population. In the paper, data are calculated in current US$. There have been several studies that 
shows the link between poverty and HIV prevalence. Poverty may increase HIV prevalence by 
facilitating the spread of disease (Butler, 2000), by provoking population shift from rural to urban for 
employment which can lead to higher HIV vulnerability (Wallace,1993) and by the lack of adequate 
healthcare system for sexually transmitted disease (Nattrass,2004). 
7. Newly infected Children 
 Newly infected children is defined as estimated number of newly infected with HIV within the 
age of 0 to 14. The data are derived from the World Development Indicator. 
8. ART coverage 
 Antiretroviral treatment coverage is defined as percentage of people living with HIV who 
receive ART treatment. The data are obtained from UNAIDS data set. Although ARV drugs are not a 
cure, it can delay the deterioration of patient’s immune system and also believed to reduce the level 
of infectiousness. So, ARV may be viewed also as a preventive tool (Baggaley, Garnett, & Ferguson, 
2006). 
9. Primary school enrollment rate (% gross) 
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 Gross primary enrollment rate is the total enrollment in primary secondary education, 
regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of population of official primary education age (World 
Bank). For infectious disease like HIV/AIDS, health campaigns play a significant role in prevention of 
disease. So, schooling can be considered as an important factor for increasing access and 
understanding of health campaigns (Kilian et al,1999). Furthermore, awareness about HIV/AIDS may 
be promoted through literacy which can in turn lead to good behaviors such as condom-use to prevent 
the spread of virus (Council, 2003). 
10. Female unemployment rate 
 Female unemployment rate is described as percentage of female labor force who are within 
15 to 45 years of age. The estimates are modeled by International Labor Organization and the data 
are derived from World Development Indicator. According to (UNAIDS, 2004), 18.5 million out of the 
37 million adults living with HIV are women in 2004. Poverty can force individuals, mostly women, into 
commercial sex for survival which could lead to the spread of disease (Poundstone, Strathdee, & 
Celentano, 2004).  
 
The definition and source of data are summarized in the following table. 
Table 1: The definition and source of data 
Variable Description Source 
HIV prevalence total  % of population age 15-49 year World Development Indicator 
AIDS-related death Estimated numbers World Development Indicator 
ODA for HIV Total disbursement in current 
US$(million) 
OECD data set 
ODA for anti-corruption 
strategies 
Total disbursement in current 
US$ (million) 
OECD data set 
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Public health expenditure 
per capita 
In current US$ World Development Indicator 
GPD per capita In current US$ World Development Indicator 
Child new infection Estimated number of newly 
infected with HIV in age 0-14 
World Development Indicator 
Primary enrollment rate 
(gross) 
% of population (gross) World Development Indicator 
Female unemployment 
rate 
% of female labor force (15-24) 
(modeled ILO estimate) 
World Development Indicator 
ART coverage % of people living with HIV who 
receive ART treatment 
UNAIDS data set 
 
To check the robustness of the use of fixed effect model, the Husman test is performed. 
According to the results, it is justified to use fixed effect model rather than random effect model 
for both model-1 and model-2. By using the fixed effect model, our results cannot be biased 
because of time-constant country-specific characteristics that can have impact on our 
dependent variables. 
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                Prob>chi2 =      0.0000
                          =      611.24
                  chi2(8) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
       lnART     -.0589028     -.105048        .0461452        .0145046
  lnchildnew      .2129263     .1252222         .087704        .0162071
lnfemaleun~p     -.0885442     .0524822       -.1410264         .030424
       lnedu      .8433232     1.040246        -.196923        .1512706
      lnhexp      .1829701     .0399675        .1430025        .0673313
       lngdp      .1463643     .4681812       -.3218169        .0645406
dummyantic~r     -.0697609    -.0866177        .0168568        .0213214
    lnhivoda      .0524986     -.002231        .0547297        .0129959
                                                                              
                     re           fe         Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
. hausman re fe
                (V_b-V_B is not positive definite)
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0000
                          =      345.49
                  chi2(7) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
       lnART     -.2109225    -.1524063       -.0585162               .
lnfemaleun~p      .0696708    -.3080056        .3776764               .
       lnedu      1.444084     1.416451        .0276336               .
      lnhexp     -.4424764    -.4148842       -.0275922               .
       lngdp      .9990161     .4908039        .5082123               .
dummyantic~r     -.0429306    -.0123906         -.03054               .
    lnhivoda     -.0251794     .1443593       -.1695387               .
                                                                              
                     fe           re         Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
. hausman fe re
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CHAPTER FOUR: EMPRICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 Before running the regression, descriptive statistics including summary of data with 
mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum values and comparative analysis is 
described in the following tables. 
Table 2: Summary of data 
 
Table 3: Mean values of each country for main variables 
 
HIV prevalence AIDS death HIV ODA ODA for anti-corruption COC % 
Afghanistan 0.1 410 2.86662 4.3165092 2.163956 
 
Algeria 0.1 200 1.163511 0.6974852 36.98231 
 
Dominican Republic 1.44 5360 22.41788 0.9413437 26.12183 
 
El Salvador 0.57 550 5.940194 1.1362404 48.50524 
 
Georgia 0.23 200 6.908724 1.3956502 57.63963 
 
Guatemala 0.56 1030 12.37507 1.1470233 32.33859 
 
Indonesia 0.34 17430 49.86143 4.3572662 27.9497 
 
Malawi 11.51 51500 132.026 0.7113223 36.19109 
 
Morocco 0.1 1000 5.823134 0.5703753 46.06205 
 
Childnewin~n          170    2377.647    5542.773        100      28000
                                                                       
 ARTcoverage          170    18.61176    15.74132          0         70
FemaleUnem~e          170    9.066876    6.045672       .535     28.659
Primaryenr~s          170    107.9646    14.05273   78.73561   146.5065
   GDPpercap          170    2587.078    1751.772   250.2941   6583.116
Publicheal~a          170    135.2701    97.14393   17.72507   361.7292
                                                                       
         COC          170    35.29373    14.74974    .952381   75.48077
ODAforanti~n          170    1.624409    2.616834          0   14.54224
      HIVODA          170    40.27924    79.00949    .036633   473.9173
   AIDSdeath          170    11330.59    20967.05        100     110000
HIVprevale~e          170    1.431765    2.861092         .1       13.9
                                                                       
    Variable          Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
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Nepal 0.28 2420 19.03651 0.049889 28.74543 
 
Peru 0.33 2450 8.884884 2.8225838 46.50809 
 
Pakistan 0.1 1640 9.978004 0.556493 17.80279 
 
Senegal 0.72 2230 19.15949 0.9530565 42.65609 
 
Sri Lanka 0.1 130 1.823436 0.1150755 49.05621 
 
Tanzania 5.69 72300 305.8045 4.6404921 34.12524 
 
Thailand 1.29 20900 34.25749 0.1205157 47.44246 
 
Ukraine 0.88 12870 46.42028 3.0836338 19.70273 
 
 
From the above tables, it can be seen that Malawi ranks the highest in HIV prevalence 
and Afghanistan, Algeria, Morocco, Pakistan and Sri Lanka rank the lowest. Furthermore, the 
overall mean for HIV prevalence is 1.43 and Dominican Republic, Malawi and Tanzania are 
well above this overall mean. 
For the case of AIDS-related death, Tanzania and Malawi are the highest countries 
while Sri Lanka, Algeria and Georgia are the lowest. Indonesia, Malawi, Tanzania, Thailand 
and Ukraine are well above the overall average which is 11330. Tanzania is the country which 
receives the highest ODA for HIV and Algeria is the country which receives the lowest. In 
terms of average ODA for anti-corruption programs, Afghanistan, Indonesia , Tanzania and 
receive the highest aid and also their Control of Corruption (COC %) which is an indicator for 
corruption status of a country is lower the overall average of COC % of the studied countries 
which is 35.29 . 
For the sake of simplicity and clarity and knowing the time trend of main variables, 
graphs are demonstrated. The trend for HIV prevalence is shown in figure 4 showing that most 
of the countries except Malawi failed to demonstrate significant changes. For Malawi, the 
decreasing trend is significantly clear. 
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Figure 5 shows the general trend of AIDS-related death demonstrating that Tanzania, 
Malawi, Thailand and Ukraine are on decreasing trend while other countries show no 
significant change except Indonesia which has surprisingly increasing number of AIDS-related 
death since 2007. 
Tanzania and Malawi receive the highest amount ODA for HIV which is demonstrated 
in figure 6 and not surprisingly their HIV prevalence and AIDS-related death also rank the 
highest among the countries as mentioned above. 
 
Figure 4: Trend of HIV prevalence (2005-2014) 
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Figure 5: Trend of AIDS-death (2005-2014) 
 
Figure 6: Trend of ODA for HIV (2005-2014) 
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Figure 7: Trend of ODA for anti-corruption strategies (2005-2014) 
The trends of ODA for anti-corruption are described in figure 7. Some countries like 
Algeria, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Malawi, Morocco, Nepal, Peru, 
Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Ukraine receive ODA for anti-corruption after 2009 while the 
remaining countries receive earlier than 2009. 
The corruption status of the recipient countries is shown in figure 8 using Control of 
Corruption (COC) which is ranged between 0 and 100 and the higher the number, the better 
the corruption status of the country. For most of the countries, the COC is between 20 and 60 
except Pakistan, Afghanistan and Ukraine with higher than 40 and Afghanistan which is lower 
than 20. 
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 Figure 7: Trend of Control of Corruption Percentile (2005-2014) 
 
4.2 Regression result on the impact of ODA for anti-corruption on HIV prevalence 
 By using panel fixed effect model, model-1, mentioned in chapter 3, the 
following regression table is resulted. 
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Table 4: HIV prevalence and ODA for anti-corruption 
 
F test that all u_i=0: F(16, 138) = 185.91                   Prob > F = 0.0000
                                                                               
          rho    .99291679   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
      sigma_e    .12237999
      sigma_u    1.4489447
                                                                               
        _cons    -9.874648   1.249458    -7.90   0.000    -12.34521    -7.40409
        lnART     -.105048    .023517    -4.47   0.000    -.1515483   -.0585477
   lnchildnew     .1252222   .0300607     4.17   0.000     .0657831    .1846614
lnfemaleunemp     .0524822   .0646442     0.81   0.418     -.075339    .1803034
        lnedu     1.040246   .2383795     4.36   0.000     .5688977    1.511595
       lnhexp     .0399675   .1084021     0.37   0.713    -.1743764    .2543114
        lngdp     .4681812   .1262904     3.71   0.000     .2184668    .7178957
dummyanticorr    -.0866177   .0319018    -2.72   0.007    -.1496972   -.0235382
     lnhivoda     -.002231   .0221459    -0.10   0.920    -.0460202    .0415581
                                                                               
     lnhivpre        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                               
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.2158                        Prob > F          =     0.0000
                                                F(8,138)          =      15.45
     overall = 0.0004                                         max =         10
     between = 0.0015                                         avg =        9.6
     within  = 0.4725                                         min =          6
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: count1                          Number of groups  =         17
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =        163
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
t statistics in parentheses
                            
N                     163   
                            
                  (-7.90)   
_cons              -9.875***
                  (-4.47)   
lnART              -0.105***
                   (4.17)   
lnchildnew          0.125***
                   (0.81)   
lnfemaleun~p       0.0525   
                   (4.36)   
lnedu               1.040***
                   (0.37)   
lnhexp             0.0400   
                   (3.71)   
lngdp               0.468***
                  (-2.72)   
dummyantic~r      -0.0866** 
                  (-0.10)   
lnhivoda         -0.00223   
                            
                 lnhivpre   
                      (1)   
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Based on the results shown in above tables, p-value for dummy variable of receiving 
ODA for anti-corruption is 0.007 which is much less than 0.05 (5% level of significance). 
Therefore, ODA for anti-corruption has impact on HIV prevalence. In other words, if the 
recipient countries have less HIV prevalence when they receive ODA for anti-corruption. To 
be exact, if a country receives ODA for anti-corruption, HIV prevalence is 8.6 percent less than 
when it does not. 
One more interesting result is the impact of ART coverage on HIV prevalence. 
According to the above result, ART coverage has negative impact on HIV prevalence and this 
result is statistically significant. If one more percent of people living with HIV receive, HIV 
prevalence will be reduced 0.1 percent. This result is consistent with previous study which 
states that ART is not only a treatment but also a preventive tool (Baggaley et al,2006).  
4.3 Regression result on the impact of ODA for anti-corruption on AIDS-related death 
For AIDS-related death, model-2 as stated in chapter 3 is used to investigate the impact 
of ODA for anti-corruption on AIDS-related death. The results are as follows. 
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 Table 5: AIDS-death and ODA for anti-corruption 
 
F test that all u_i=0: F(16, 140) = 111.57                   Prob > F = 0.0000
                                                                               
          rho    .98782941   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
      sigma_e    .23614272
      sigma_u    2.1274521
                                                                               
        _cons    -3.740291   2.306841    -1.62   0.107    -8.301039    .8204567
        lnART    -.2077183   .0435739    -4.77   0.000    -.2938663   -.1215704
        lnedu     1.466712   .4308759     3.40   0.001     .6148475    2.318577
       lnhexp    -.4453322   .2045998    -2.18   0.031    -.8498369   -.0408275
        lngdp     .9696255   .2322685     4.17   0.000     .5104182    1.428833
dummyanticorr    -.0437692   .0602491    -0.73   0.469     -.162885    .0753466
     lnhivoda     -.021368   .0418629    -0.51   0.611    -.1041332    .0613972
                                                                               
      lndeath        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                               
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.5168                        Prob > F          =     0.0000
                                                F(6,140)          =       7.84
     overall = 0.1025                                         max =         10
     between = 0.1004                                         avg =        9.6
     within  = 0.2516                                         min =          6
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: count1                          Number of groups  =         17
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =        163
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
t statistics in parentheses
                            
N                     163   
                            
                  (-1.62)   
_cons              -3.740   
                  (-4.77)   
lnART              -0.208***
                   (3.40)   
lnedu               1.467***
                  (-2.18)   
lnhexp             -0.445*  
                   (4.17)   
lngdp               0.970***
                  (-0.73)   
dummyantic~r      -0.0438   
                  (-0.51)   
lnhivoda          -0.0214   
                            
                  lndeath   
                      (1)   
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According to the above results, it can be seen that receiving ODA for anti-corruption 
has negative impact on AIDS-related death. However, p-value is greater than 0.05 (5% level 
of significance). Therefore, the result is insignificant. Again, for ART coverage, it has 
significant negative impact on AIDS-related death (p-value is less than 0.05). If one more 
percent of people living with HIV receive ART treatment, AIDS-related death will be reduced 
by 0.2 percent. 
4.4 Regression result on the impact of ODA for anti-corruption on Corruption status  
To check whether ODA for anti-corruption has significant effect on corruption status 
of the recipient countries, one more regression is conducted by using panel fixed effect model. 
The model is derived from the paper “Determinants of corruption in developing countries’ 
conducted by Ghulam Shabbir and Mumtaz Anwar in 2007.   The model is as follow: 
CPIit = β1GDPit + β2EconomicFreedomit + β3GlobalizationIndexit + 
β4PressFreedomIndexit + β5LevelofDemocracyit + β6GiniCoefficientit + β7PrimaryEnrollmentit 
+ Uit 
 
Table 6: Control of Corruption Percentile and ODA for anti-corruption 
F test that all u_i=0: F(15, 89) = 26.08                     Prob > F = 0.0000
                                                                                            
                       rho    .87802749   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
                   sigma_e    5.7827885
                   sigma_u    15.515307
                                                                                            
                     _cons     39.20616   36.43156     1.08   0.285    -33.18258    111.5949
Primaryenrollmentrategross     .3366866   .1280651     2.63   0.010     .0822241    .5911492
            Democracyindex     2.431694   2.236349     1.09   0.280    -2.011885    6.875272
         PressFreedomIndex    -.2997172   .2782216    -1.08   0.284    -.8525375    .2531032
        Globalizationindex     .4140952   .4362383     0.95   0.345     -.452701    1.280891
      EconomicFreedomIndex    -.6561387   .4704982    -1.39   0.167    -1.591009    .2787312
                     lngdp    -2.516545   3.656358    -0.69   0.493    -9.781651    4.748561
                 dummyanti    -1.837842   1.824009    -1.01   0.316    -5.462109    1.786426
                                                                                            
                       COC        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                            
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.6135                        Prob > F          =     0.0142
                                                F(7,89)           =       2.69
     overall = 0.0044                                         max =          7
     between = 0.0189                                         avg =        7.0
     within  = 0.1746                                         min =          7
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: count1                          Number of groups  =         16
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =        112
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However, in this paper, Control of Corruption in percentile rank is used instead of 
Corruption Perception Index because measurement of CPI has been changed since 2012. 
Therefore, if CPI is used, measurement of it will be different before and after 2012. 
Furthermore, Gini coefficient is excluded due to data availability. According to the results, 
receiving ODA for anti-corruption has negative impact on corruption status. Control of 
Corruption is decreased by 1.83 percentage point when a country receives ODA for anti-
corruption. In other words, anti-corruption ODA decreases the corruption status rather than 
promotes it. But p-value is much higher than 5% level of significance and therefore the result 
is insignificant. 
In the scatter plot described below, negative correlation between COC % and anti-
corruption ODA is demonstrated. 
 
Figure 9: Scatter plot of COC % and log of ODA for anti-corruption 
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All the main results of the paper are described in the following bar-chart. In sum, ODA 
for anti-corruption has significant negative impact only on HIV prevalence and the impacts on 
AIDS-death and Control of Corruption Percentile are insignificant. 
 
 
Figure 10: The impact of ODA for anti-corruption on HIV prevalence, AIDS-death and 
Control of Corruption Percentile 
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION 
  
 There have been several studies to show the positive impact of ODA on HIV outcomes 
and the fact that corruption undermines the effectiveness of ODA on HIV outcomes. Therefore, 
realizing that control of corruption is a prerequisite condition for effective ODA, donor 
countries provide financial assistance to promote corruption status of the recipient countries. 
However, no studies have been conducted to investigate the impact of these assistance for anti-
corruption strategies. Basically, this paper tries to fill this gap. 
 This paper uses panel-fixed effect model using data of seventeen countries from Asia, 
Latin America, Africa, and Europe with ten-year period between 2005 and 2014. All of these 
countries are among high corrupt countries in the world. The main finding of the paper is that 
if a country receives ODA for anti-corruption, its HIV prevalence will become less but its 
AIDS-death is not affected. In fact, this is a two-stage process. First, ODA for anti-corruption 
will affect corruption status and then corruption status will affect HIV outcomes. Therefore, 
one more regression is run to investigate this link and whether ODA for anti-corruption has 
effective impact on corruption status. This result shows that ODA for anti-corruption decreases 
the corruption status rather than promotes it, though the result is insignificant. 
 According to the results, it can be said that corruption chain in prevention programs of 
HIV/AIDS such as falsification of records and informal payments is broken down to some 
extent. Thus, it should be more encouraged to support technical assistance to promote 
appropriate financial management and legal foundations for punishment for informal payments. 
For AIDS treatment programs to be more effective, the most essential thing is the availability 
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of ART drugs. One of the main impediments is the price of the drug and selling of  these 
expensive ART drugs to the informal market creating very dangerous situation which can lead 
to many problems including drug resistance. Therefore, to reduce the AIDS-related death, ODA 
should also emphasize on ART drug availability and preventing informal market formation. 
Furthermore, ministry of health, NGO, INGO and pharmaceutical companies should 
collaborate to promote drug availability for achieving high ART coverage. 
 Among the Sustainable Development Goals, goal-3 is to ensure healthy lives and 
promote well-being for all at all ages. But to achieve this goal, HIV/AIDS is still a barrier 
particularly for developing countries. Furthermore, the international effort to fight against 
HIV/AIDS would not be effective as much as it should be unless corruption status of the 
countries is improved enough. According to the results in the paper, although ODA for anti-
corruption has negative impact on HIV prevalence, its impact on corruption status in general 
is insignificant. In other words, ODA for anti-corruption fails to promote corruption of the 
foreign aid recipient countries at least for the countries studied in this paper. Therefore, fighting 
against corruption should be among the top priorities to make the global effort to address HIV 
issues and to achieve the SDGs more effectively.  
However, there are several socio-economic factors that can favor corruption such as 
poverty, low education, and weak legal institutions. Thus, formal and civic education should 
be promoted, poverty-reduction policies and plans should be supported and legal foundations 
for punishment for corruption should be firmly established. In conclusion, if corruption status 
is effectively promoted, the international effort to tackle HIV/AIDS problem which is one of 
the threatening issue to the whole world may be more effective than before. 
It should be encouraged to conduct more studies on effectiveness of ODA for anti-
corruption on health outcomes including life expectancy, infant mortality rate and maternal 
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mortality rate. Moreover, the effectiveness of ODA for anti-corruption should be evaluated 
with more countries and abundant data. This paper may be a contribution to these future 
researches with more rigorous model specification and advanced econometric techniques. 
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       APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A 
Stata output for table 4: HIV prevalence and ODA for anti-corruption 
 
  
F test that all u_i=0: F(16, 138) = 185.91                   Prob > F = 0.0000
                                                                               
          rho    .99291679   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
      sigma_e    .12237999
      sigma_u    1.4489447
                                                                               
        _cons    -9.874648   1.249458    -7.90   0.000    -12.34521    -7.40409
        lnART     -.105048    .023517    -4.47   0.000    -.1515483   -.0585477
   lnchildnew     .1252222   .0300607     4.17   0.000     .0657831    .1846614
lnfemaleunemp     .0524822   .0646442     0.81   0.418     -.075339    .1803034
        lnedu     1.040246   .2383795     4.36   0.000     .5688977    1.511595
       lnhexp     .0399675   .1084021     0.37   0.713    -.1743764    .2543114
        lngdp     .4681812   .1262904     3.71   0.000     .2184668    .7178957
dummyanticorr    -.0866177   .0319018    -2.72   0.007    -.1496972   -.0235382
     lnhivoda     -.002231   .0221459    -0.10   0.920    -.0460202    .0415581
                                                                               
     lnhivpre        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                               
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.2158                        Prob > F          =     0.0000
                                                F(8,138)          =      15.45
     overall = 0.0004                                         max =         10
     between = 0.0015                                         avg =        9.6
     within  = 0.4725                                         min =          6
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: count1                          Number of groups  =         17
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =        163
. xtreg lnhivpre lnhivoda dummyanticorr lngdp lnhexp lnedu lnfemaleunemp lnchildnew lnART,fe
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APPENDIX B 
Stata output for table 5: AIDS-death and ODA for anti-corruption 
 
 
 
  
   
  
F test that all u_i=0: F(16, 140) = 111.57                   Prob > F = 0.0000
                                                                               
          rho    .98782941   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
      sigma_e    .23614272
      sigma_u    2.1274521
                                                                               
        _cons    -3.740291   2.306841    -1.62   0.107    -8.301039    .8204567
        lnART    -.2077183   .0435739    -4.77   0.000    -.2938663   -.1215704
        lnedu     1.466712   .4308759     3.40   0.001     .6148475    2.318577
       lnhexp    -.4453322   .2045998    -2.18   0.031    -.8498369   -.0408275
        lngdp     .9696255   .2322685     4.17   0.000     .5104182    1.428833
dummyanticorr    -.0437692   .0602491    -0.73   0.469     -.162885    .0753466
     lnhivoda     -.021368   .0418629    -0.51   0.611    -.1041332    .0613972
                                                                               
      lndeath        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                               
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.5168                        Prob > F          =     0.0000
                                                F(6,140)          =       7.84
     overall = 0.1025                                         max =         10
     between = 0.1004                                         avg =        9.6
     within  = 0.2516                                         min =          6
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: count1                          Number of groups  =         17
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =        163
. xtreg lndeath lnhivoda dummyanticorr lngdp lnhexp lnedu lnART,fe
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APPENDIX C 
Stata output for table6: Control of Corruption Percentile and ODA for anti-corruption 
 
 
. xtreg COC dummyanti lngdp EconomicFreedomIndex PressFreedomIndex Democracyindex Primaryenrollmentrategross,fe
F test that all u_i=0: F(15, 89) = 26.08                     Prob > F = 0.0000
                                                                                            
                       rho    .87802749   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
                   sigma_e    5.7827885
                   sigma_u    15.515307
                                                                                            
                     _cons     39.20616   36.43156     1.08   0.285    -33.18258    111.5949
Primaryenrollmentrategross     .3366866   .1280651     2.63   0.010     .0822241    .5911492
            Democracyindex     2.431694   2.236349     1.09   0.280    -2.011885    6.875272
         PressFreedomIndex    -.2997172   .2782216    -1.08   0.284    -.8525375    .2531032
        Globalizationindex     .4140952   .4362383     0.95   0.345     -.452701    1.280891
      EconomicFreedomIndex    -.6561387   .4704982    -1.39   0.167    -1.591009    .2787312
                     lngdp    -2.516545   3.656358    -0.69   0.493    -9.781651    4.748561
                 dummyanti    -1.837842   1.824009    -1.01   0.316    -5.462109    1.786426
                                                                                            
                       COC        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                            
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.6135                        Prob > F          =     0.0142
                                                F(7,89)           =       2.69
     overall = 0.0044                                         max =          7
     between = 0.0189                                         avg =        7.0
     within  = 0.1746                                         min =          7
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: count1                          Number of groups  =         16
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =        112
